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INTRODUCTION
THE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINOLOGY ON
CRIMINAL LAW: EVALUATING
ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 19, 1986, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the sale of a new drug, AZT, for the treatment of
patients with AIDS.' The drug had been in development for several
years, and had been tested in a randomized clinical trial involving
282 patients. 2 Using a standard medical research trial design, 137
patients were chosen by lottery to receive placebo (sugar) pills, and
145 were chosen to receive pills containing the real drug. In a
followup period lasting up to six months, nineteen of the placebo
group and one of the AZT group died. The experiment was halted
ahead of schedule, although not nearly as soon as demanded by
doctors and AIDS patients who wanted the drug to be approved
before the research was completed. The FDA held fast to the policy
it had adopted after the thalidomide disaster of the early 1960s, refusing to allow any drug to enter the market until it has been tested
in a randomized clinical trial.3 The drug immediately became the
* Symposium Editor. Professor of Criminology, University of Maryland and President, Crime Control Institute, Washington, D.C. Ph.D., Yale University, 1976. Diploma
in Criminology, Cambridge University, 1973. M.A., University of Chicago, 1970. B.A.
Denison University, 1970. This research was supported in part by grant number
861JCXK043 from the National Institute of Justice to the Crime Control Institute.
Points of view or opinions stated herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the official views of the U.S. Department ofJustice.
1 Philip J. Hilts, Results of Preliminary Tests Prompt AIDS Drug's Release, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 20, 1986, at Al.
2 Margaret A. Fischl, et al., The Efficacy ofAzidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 317 N. ENG.J. MED. 185 (1987).
3 STUARTJ. PoCoCK, CLINICAL TRIALS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH 26 (1983).
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standard treatment for all AIDS patients.
On May 27, 1984, the U.S. National Institute of Justice announced the results of a randomized clinical trial of the use of arrest
for misdemeanor domestic violence. 4 The 314-case experiment,
conducted with the Minneapolis Police Department, used a lottery
method that assigned about one third of the probable cause suspects to be arrested, one third to be advised, and the rest to be sent
away from the home on threat of arrest. 5 Over a followup period
lasting at least six months, about ten percent of the arrested suspects and about twenty percent of the suspects not arrested were
officially detected to have committed one or more repeated domestic assaults. 6 Citing these results, the Attorney General of the
United States four months later issued a report recommending that
arrest be made the standard treatment in cases of misdemeanor domestic assault. 7 Within two years, "preferred" arrest became the
most common urban police policy for those cases. 8 By 1989,
mandatory or preferred arrest policies were reported by eighty-four
percent of urban police agencies. 9 By late 1991, fifteen states and
the District of Columbia had passed mandatory arrest statutes for
cases in which there was probable cause to believe that misdemeanor domestic violence had occurred.' 0
The parallels between AZT for AIDS and arrest for domestic
violence seem obvious. Both ailments are serious, afflicting millions
of people and killing thousands each year. Victims of both ailments
had strong political constituencies pressing to put the treatment
into widespread use as soon as possible. Both treatments were carefully evaluated by scientists in collaboration with clinical practitioners, using the most advanced research design available for inferring
cause and effect (the randomized, controlled experiment).' 1 Both
evaluations, by the basic sciences of biochemistry and criminology,
respectively, had an apparently strong influence on the respective
professional practices. Unfortunately, both treatments were shown
4 Lawrence W. Sherman & Ellen G. Cohn, The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, 23 LAW & Soc. REv. 117, 121 (1989).
5 Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest For
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1984).
6 Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Family Violence Incidents:
An Analysis of an ExperimentalDesign With Incomplete Randomization, 83J. AM. STAT. ASSN. 70
(1988).
7
8

1984 U.S. Ar'Y

GEN. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE REP.

17 (1984).

Sherman & Cohn, supra note 4, at 125.

9 LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ch. 5 (1992).
10 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46
1 1 POCOCK, supra note 3.

(1992).
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only to reduce the suffering associated with the target problems, but
not to cure those problems.
A final parallel is less obvious. Both experiments raised basic
questions about the relationship between science and professional
practice, generating intense controversy. Both of them led to clear
recommendations to change the standard procedures governing scientific influences on policy-making. Both of them led to charges
that scientists were morally insensitive to the interests and suffering
of victims. The irony of this final parallel is that the two respective
controversies went in opposite directions. Critics of the FDA
charged that it used too much science, caution and delay before
adoption of the new treatment. 12 Critics of the NIJ experiment
charged that it used too little science, caution and delay before recommending adoption of the new treatment.' 3 The FDA responded
by considering faster procedures for approving new drugs, possibly
including approval without waiting for the results of controlled experiments. The NIJ responded by funding replications of the Minneapolis experiment in six new cities (Atlanta, Charlotte, Colorado
Springs, Metro-Dade [Miami], Omaha, and Milwaukee), which are
the subject of this symposium issue.
Explaining this irony is easy, but important. Over the preceding half-century, field experiments in biochemistry had become the
basis for regulating the use of drugs as "dangerous commodities."
The common wisdom in medicine was that it was unsafe to approve
new drugs without large-scale controlled tests.1 4 The common wisdom in criminal law was just the opposite: penalties were a philosophical matter of just deserts, not an empirical question of
effectiveness. 15 Despite the pleas of some legal scholars to take
questions of sanctioning efficacy more seriously, 16 legislatures generally went about the process of making criminal law without much
concern about its "safety." And while the FDA had never before
encountered such a politically volatile disease, field experiments in
criminology had never before achieved such influence over the
12 Herbert Burkholz & Beverly Zakarian, A Shot in the Armfor the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES,

July 21, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 6.
13 Richard Lempert, From the Editor, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 505, 509-10 (1984); Richard Lempert, Spouse Abuse: Ann Arbor Rushed Into Arrest Ordinance Without Studying Side Effects, ANN ARBOR NEWS (June 21, 1987); Richard Lempert, Humility is a Virtue, 23 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 146 (1989) [hereinafter Lempert, Humility is a Virtue]. See also James W.
Meeker & Arnold Binder, Reforms as Experiments: The Impact of the 'Minneapolis Experiment'
on Police Policy, 17J. POL. ScI. & ADMIN. 147 (1990); Arnold Binder &James w. Meeker,
Experiments as Reforms, 16J. CRIM. JUST. 347 (1988).

14 PococK, supra note 3; Burkholz & Zakarian, supra note 12.
15 See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 45-6 (1976).
16 Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. GHI. L. REV. 627-28 (1966).
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course of the criminal law. 17 As one observer put it, "the Minneapolis experiment probably reached the high water mark of research
impact: in view of the publicity that the research received and the
climate in which it was released, one can probably expect that social
research will seldom have as much impact as this experiment did." 18
Just as some AIDS patients were shocked to discover that they
could not have legal access to any new drug they chose even though
they were dying, some criminologists were shocked to discover that
criminology could have a clear impact on the shape of the criminal
law. While that possibility is arguably one of the basic purposes of
this journal, the lack of precedent for the dramatic impact of the
Minneapolis experiment left criminology understandably unprepared to deal with the many moral and technical questions that impact raised. Is criminology a mature enough science-especially
compared to biochemistry-to be guiding public policy at all? How
much research is enough to support a policy recommendation?
Should policy research results be publicized before they have been
replicated? Should criminologists report only the average effect of a
criminal law policy on a given sample, or must they also examine
any systematic differences in the effects of the punishment on different kinds of people? Is crime control the only metric by which criminal law should be evaluated, or should other quality of life
criteria-family unity, offender employability, children's trauma at
seeing parents arrested-also be considered? Should the burden of
proof lie more heavily on criminologists recommending changes in
current practice than on those supporting the status quo, even when
no research is available to justify current practices?
In choosing the Minneapolis experiment and its replications as
the subject of this symposium volume, the editors have two goals.
One goal is to report the most comprehensive information available
about the effects of arrest for this most pervasive problem of violence. With some 2,000 murders and over four million police encounters each year in the United States alone, the subject of
domestic violence needs little justification for a journal of criminal
law and its basic science. 19 The other goal is equally important: to
explore the concrete problems of using criminology to influence the
criminal law, with the domestic violence arrest experiments as a case
study. These problems become especially complex when a crucial
experiment is replicated, and generates conflicting results in differ17 But seeJOAN PETERSILIA, THE INFLUENCE OF CRIMINALJUSTICE RESEARCH 94 (1987).

18 Sherman & Cohn, supra note 4, at 126.
19 SHERMAN, supra note 9.

INFLUENCE OF CRIMINOLOGY

19921

ent cities. Interpreting those diverse findings poses a substantial
challenge for the science of criminology; determining how the criminal law should respond to them is an even greater challenge.
This introduction attempts to guide the reader towards accomplishing both goals. Starting with a review of the rationale for conducting controlled experiments in criminal sanctions, it shows why
police policy on domestic violence was ripe for such an experiment
in 1980. The Minneapolis experiment is then described in some detail, including its policy recommendations against mandatory arrest
laws and its relative influence in the passage of such laws. The five
replication experiments are also described in some detail, so as to
make possible an accounting for their diverse results. The foreword
concludes with an assessment of the teachings of the past decade
about both of this Volume's concerns: policing domestic violence
more effectively, and using experimental criminology more wisely.
II.

CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS IN CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

The importance of controlled experiments in criminal law derives largely from our ignorance of the true nature of criminal deterrence. As Professor Norval Morris has observed, every criminal law
system in the world (except Greenland's) has deterrence as its "primary and essential postulate." 20 As Sir Arthur Goodhart once observed, if punishment "cannot deter, then we might as well scrap the
whole of our criminal law."' 2 1 Yet for most of human history, the
evidence of the deterrent effects of criminal law has been little more
22
than what Morris calls "a surfeit of unsubstantiated speculation. "
In the past quarter century, substantial strides have been made
toward filling the knowledge gap about the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. A series of theoretical treatises 23 was followed by a
prestigious National Academy of Sciences panel report on the methodological limitations of existing deterrence studies, 24 a series of
survey studies published in this Journal 2 5 and elsewhere, 2 6 crosssectional analyses of the relationship of criminal sanctions to crime
20 Morris, supra note
21 Id.
22 Id.

16, at 631.

23 JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE

& GORDON

J.

(1974);

FRANKLYN E. ZIMRING

HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973); JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND

DETERRENCE (1975).
24 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds. 1978).

25 Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and
Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980);
Raymond Paternoster et al., Estimating Perceptual Stability and Deterrent Effects: The Role of
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rates, 2 7 and quasi-experimental (before and after) evaluations of the
28
effects of sudden changes in sanctions like capital punishment,
mandatory prison sentences, 29 and police crackdowns. 30 None of
these research methods, however, has been able to resolve the lingering problems of distinguishing mere correlations from true causation. As a result, our knowledge of the deterrent or other
consequences of criminal sanctions-including a possible increase
in crime 3 '-remains sketchy and uncertain.
Controlled experiments are fundamentally different from all
other kinds of research. They are uniquely capable of eliminating
alternative causes for observed effects, or plausible rival hypotheses
also consistent with the evidence. 32 In all other research designs the
scientist must specify which rival theories must be tested and eliminated. In controlled experiments, even theories that the scientist
never considered can usually be eliminated automatically. By making two groups comparable with respect to virtually all characteristics (within the limits of sampling error) except the factor under study
(like AZT or arrest), a controlled experiment leaves very little doubt
about inferring causation from any observed correlations-at least
within the particular sample under study.3 3 As we shall see, howPerceived Legal Punishment in the Inhibition of CriminalInvolvement, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 270 (1983).
26 Gary F. Jensen, Crime Doesn't Pay: Correlates of a Shared Misunderstanding, 17 Soc.
PROB. 189 (1969); Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of CriminalDeterrence,41 AM. Soc.
REV. 442 (1976); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the
Perceived Risk of Arrest. Testing an Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561
(1991).
27 RobertJ. Sampson &Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & Soc'y REV. 163 (1988). In this author's opinion,
this is by far the best of these analyses.
28 David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence On an Old
Controversy 86 AM.J. Soc. 139 (1980); Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and CapitalPunishment. An Examination of the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367
(1991).
29 Colin Loftin & David McDowall, One With A Gun Gets You Two: Mandatory Sentencing
and Firearms Violence in Detroit, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 150 (1981); Colin
Loftin & David McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the FloridaFelony Firearm Law, 75J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250 (1984).
30 H. LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER (1981); Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initialand Residual Deterrence, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW

OF RESEARCH 1 (Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris, eds., 1990).
3i A theory about which much exposition and some evidence are also accumulating.
See RICHARD LEMERT, SOCIAL PATHOLOGY (1951); HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS (1963);
David Farrington, The Effects of Public Labelling, 17 BR.J. CRIMINOLOGY 112 (1977); Raymond Paternoster & LeeAnn Iovanni, The Labelling Perspectiveand Delinquency: An Elaboration of The Theory and An Assessment of the Evidence, 6 JusT. Q. 359 (1989).
32 THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION 7-8 (1979).
33 RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS (1971).
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ever, generalizing from one sample to other populations is quite another matter.
The power to infer cause and effect has made controlled experimentation especially prominent in medical research, which has been
blessed with far greater financial resources than criminological research. It has used those resources and the experimental method to
accomplish the testing and approval of the Salk vaccine for polio,
the use of penicillin to control infections, and the use of streptomycin to treat tuberculosis. 34 Of equal importance is the role that controlled experiments have played in putting a stop to harmful
medical practices, like blindness-causing oxygen treatments for premature infants, 35 bleeding as a standard medical treatment, 36 removal of intestinal parts to cure epilepsy, removing teeth to cure a
pitcher's sore arm, and extended bed rest after heart attacks. 37 It is
largely because of the demonstrated dangers of treatments introduced without controlled tests that such tests became mandatory for
new drugs in 1969, and why they continue to be used to expose
38
established treatments that in fact make patients sicker.
The power to determine what works and what doesn't has not
been lost on scholars of the criminal law. As early as 1959, Professors Zeisel, Kalven and Buchholz advanced the case for conducting
controlled experiments in law. 3 9 Their argument overruled the
standard objection to such research: the claim that the Constitution
prohibits random assignment of punishment options as discriminatory. They pointed out that present decisionmaking in criminal justice is already so shot through with arbitrary and discriminatory
practices that, if anything, controlled experiments tend to make
decisionmaking less discriminatory. By creating equal probability for
each subject to receive each of the alternative treatments, random
assignment formulas in controlled experiments remove the influences of race, sex, class and demeanor. The only disparity left is
between the experimental and control groups, a disparity which
constitutes no discrimination against any class protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the disparity is arguably unjust for
34 POCOCK supra note

3, ch. 1.
William A. Silverman, The Lessons of Retrolental Fibroplasia, 236 (6) Sci. Am. 100
(1977).
35

36 POCOCK,

supra note 3.

37 Howard H. Hiatt, will Your Next Hospital Stay Be Necessary?, WALL ST.

J., Nov. 18,
1986, § 1, at 32.
38 Roy W. Beck et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Corticosteroids in the Treatment of
Acute Optic Neuritis, 326 NEW ENG.J. MED. 581 (1992); Sandra Blakeslee, Treatment for Eye
Disease Aay Worsen Condition, Study Says, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 27 1992, at A14.
39 HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 241 (1959).
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those particular subjects, that cost is balanced against the benefits of
the knowledge that a controlled experiment can produce.
This argument later led ChiefJustice Burger's advisory committee on legal experimentation to endorse controlled experiments in
criminal law. 40 The committee's logic rested heavily on the benefits

that were presumed to result from completion of a well-designed,
statistically powerful experiment. Their report created a special ethical burden to guard against methodologically weak criminology or
research designs that were doomed from the start (from such
problems as inadequate sample size) to be unable to accomplish
their objectives; these would impose the cost of disparity with no
countervailing benefit. But as a report of the Social Science Research Council observed, it is extremely difficult to conduct controlled experiments properly. 4 ' The organizational complexity of
controlled experiments far exceeds that of standard social science
research methods, and fits in very uneasily with the social science
research culture of universities.
It is not surprising, then, that controlled experiments in criminal law got off to a slow start. Lack of funding, ethical objections,
and organizational demands combined to discourage would-be experimenters. These obstacles were not impossible to overcome,
however, either in the U.S. or in England. 4 2 In state correctional
agencies like the California Youth Authority, and in private "think
tanks" like the Vera Institute ofJustice in New York, controlled experiments began to thrive in the early 1960s. 43 In perhaps the most

famous of these, the Vera Institute developed and tested an alternative to money bail called "release on recognizance" (ROR). In a
random assignment of persons with "community ties" to either
money bail or ROR, virtually all those assigned to ROR appeared at
court as scheduled. 4 4 The influence of this experiment was wide40 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON EXPERIMENTATION

IN THE

LAW, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981).
41 HENRY W. RIECKEN & ROBERT F. BORUCH, SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 153 (1974).

42 See David Farrington, Randomized Experiments on Crime andJustice, 4 CRIME &JUSTICE
257 (1983).
43 See, e.g., LAMAR T. EMPEY & STEPHEN D. LUBECK, THE SILVERLAKE EXPERIMENT:
DELINQUENCY THEORY AND COMMUNITY INTERACTION (1971); LAMAR T. EMPEY
& MAYNARD L. ERICKSON, THE PRovo EXPERIMENT (1972); Marguerite Warren, The Case
for Differential Treatment of Delinquents, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 47 (1969);
Ted B. Palmer, California's Community Treatment Program for Delinquent Adolescents, 8 J.
RESCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 74 (1971); PAUL LERMAN, COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL
TESTING

CONTROL (1975).

44 Charles Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project:An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial
Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963); Bernard Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact
in Criminology and the CriminalLaw Process, 68 TEX. L. REV. 319 (1965).
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spread, resulting in the adoption of ROR by legislatures across the
U.S. and in several other countries.
Even bolder experiments followed, although with less fame and
influence. In the early 1970s, the California Department of Corrections conducted an experiment of a reduction of the time served by
inmates in prison.4 5 The experiment randomly assigned 1,135 prisoners to either "full" or "reduced" prison terms, which represented
a six month reduction. The average full term was 37.9 months; the
average reduced term was 31.3 months. The researchers structured
the data analysis to show that there was no significant difference between the two groups in the rate of "unfavorable" parole outcomes.
But Duke University Professor Philip Cook's reanalysis of the data
found a significantly higher prevalence of recidivism measured by
arrest after release of the reduced prison term group, compared to
46
the full prison term group.
Given our general ignorance about the effects of various types
and doses of criminal sanctions, such experiments clearly meet the
threshold justifications for randomized experiments recommended
by the Federal Judicial Center. 47 Those requirements provide that
1. The present practice must either need substantial improvement or
be of doubtful effectiveness.
2. There must be significant uncertainty about the value of the proposed innovation.
3. There must be no other practical means to resolve uncertainties
about the value of the proposed innovation.
4. The experiment must be seriously intended to inform a future
choice between retaining the status quo or implementing the
innovation.
A further ethical requirement suggested by Professor Morris
was not included in the Federal Judicial Center's list. Writing in the
1960s, Morris suggested a principle of "less severity" than the status quo in any innovations to be tested by randomized experiments. 48 At that time, most of the policy options under debate, such
as deinstitutionalization ofjuvenile delinquents, were pointed in the
direction of less severity. By the 1980s, however, the tide was running the other way, with most interest groups demanding greater
severity in criminal justice responses. The choice in that context
45 JOHN E. BERECOCHEA ET AL., RES. DIVISION, CAL. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, RES. REP.
No. 62: TIME SERVED IN PRISON AND PAROLE OUTCOME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY, REPORT No. 2. (1981).
46 Address by Professor Philip Cook, Carnegie Mellon University, School of Urban &
Public Affairs, April 1988.
47 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 40, at 11.
48 Morris, supra note 16, at 648.
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was to accede to greater severity without any evaluation, or to conduct a randomized experiment in which punishments of greater severity were randomly assigned. Nowhere, perhaps, was that choice
more clearly framed than in the question of police responses to misdemeanor domestic violence.
III.

POLICE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The historical custom of police in the U.S. was to make arrests
only rarely in cases of misdemeanor domestic violence. In the later
1960s, this custom was reinforced by federal sponsorship of training
in police mediation of domestic "disturbances," including those in
which minor assaults had occurred. By the late 1970s, women's advocates used litigation and legislation to press for a policy innovation: much greater use of arrest. From the 1980s to the present, the
innovation many have recommended is mandatory arrest (required
by state law) whenever police have probable cause to believe that a
domestic assault has occurred. This recommendation clearly constitutes a substantial increase in the severity of criminal sanctions for
this particular offense. What is less understood is that it constitutes
a departure from, rather than an equalization with, the level of enforcement severity for most other misdemeanors and many felonies.
A.

UNDER-ENFORCEMENT: DOMESTIC AND OTHER VIOLENCE

As recently as 1967, the leading police professional organization, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, declared in its
training manual that "in dealing with family disputes, the power of
arrest should be exercised as a last resort."'4 9 This position was endorsed by the American Bar Association, whose 1973 Standardsfor
the Urban Police Function said that police should "engage in the resolution of conflict such as that which occurs between husband and
wife ...

in the highly populated sections of the large city, without

reliance upon criminal assault or disorderly conduct statutes." 50 In
1977, police in three metropolitan areas were observed to take
slightly longer to respond to domestic disturbance calls (4.65 minutes) than non-domestic disturbances (3.86 minutes). Police in
these areas openly told observers it was the officers' policy (not the
department's) "to proceed slowly in the hope that the problem
would be resolved or that a disputant would have left before they
49 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY 16: HANDLING
DISTURBANCE CALLS (Gaithersburg, Md.: IACP 1967).
50 ABA, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE URBAN
POLICE FUNCTION

12 (1973).
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arrived." 5 ' The expression of such policies led many to conclude
that male police officers practice discriminatory enforcement in such
cases because they side with male offenders.
The evidence is far from clear, however, that police practiced
more under-enforcement in domestic situations than in other cases in
general, or in cases of interpersonal violence in particular. By the
1970s, the best evidence from observations of police work suggested that there was no less enforcement in domestic violence
cases than in other cases of personal violence, although there was
less enforcement in cases involving a male and a female than in
cases involving two males. The evidence remains inconclusive
largely because of imprecise data on the levels of injury involved in
the different categories of cases.
The pattern of under-enforcement itself is clear. In 1966,
Professors Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Donald J. Black conducted the
first multi-city study of police arrest decisions using systematic personal observations. This study of thousands of police-citizen encounters in Boston, Chicago and Washington found that, in cases
where both victim and offender were present when police arrived,
only forty-five percent of all felonies involving family members resulted in arrest; the proportion was fifty-five percent if the victim
asked police to make an arrest. The arrest rate was about the same
with respect to family misdemeanors overall (47%o), although police
were more likely to comply with victim requests for misdemeanor
arrest (80%).52 In 1977, a similar study was conducted by Indiana
University Professor Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues in twentyfour police departments in three metropolitan areas: Rochester
(NY), Tampa-St. Petersburg (FL) and St. Louis (MO). One analysis
of these data found that arrests were made in only twenty-two percent of all family assault cases (including those where one party had
left the scene). 5 3 Another study of over 3,000 family violence
records in an Ohio county in 1978 found that arrests were made in
twelve percent of cases involving current or former spouses or
54
lovers.
Many reasons may account for this low level of enforcement. 5 5
One is the common law in-presence requirement for misdemeanor
arrests generally, which technically barred officers in many states
51 Nan Oppenlander, Copingor CoppingOut: Police Service Delivery in Domestic Disputes, 20
453 (1982).

CRIMINOLOGY

52 DONALDJ. BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 94 (1980).
53 Oppenlander, supra note 51 at 455.
54 Edna Erez, Intimacy, Violence and the Police, 39 HUM. REL. 265 (1986).
55 SHERMAN, supra note 9.
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from making warrantless arrests unless they had witnessed the offense. Other reasons include the muddy practical distinctions between felony and misdemeanor assaults, possibly erroneous police
perceptions of domestic violence situations as extremely dangerous
to police, 5 6 frequent victim preferences against arrest,5 7 and possibly even support by some police for the practice of spouse-beating.
What is poorly understood by most policy activists in this area, however, is that police under-enforce the laws generally, for a very wide
range of offenses.
The myth of full enforcement has been demolished by several
careful field studies of police arrest behavior. These studies show
clearly that full enforcement is not standard police practice. They
also show mixed evidence on whether police take family matters less
seriously than crimes among acquaintances or strangers. The 1966
study for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice 58 found that, in 176 encounters in which both
a suspect and a complainant were present, and in which there was
legally sufficient evidence for making an arrest, arrests were made in
only fifty-eight percent of the reported felonies and forty-four percent of the reported misdemeanors 59 . Similar evidence comes from
Ostrom's 1977 study of policing in sixty neighborhoods in three major metropolitan areas. Of the 742 cases (of all kinds of offenses) in
which police had a legal basis for an arrest of a single suspect present at the scene, arrests were made in forty-two percent of the felonies and fourteen percent of the misdemeanors 60 . There was no
victim present in over half the cases. The victim expressed a clear
preference for arrest in only ten percent of these cases, yet police
still failed to make arrests in over half (53%) of those. Across all types
56 The literature now suggests that domestic violence is not very dangerous in terms
of the danger of police officers dying, but domestic situations do appear to constitute a
frequent source of injuries to police. Mona Margarita, Killing the Police: Myths and Motives,
452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 63 (1980); David N. Konstantin, Homicides of
American Law Enforcement Officers, 1978-80, 1 JUST. Q. 29, 42-43 (1984); JOEL GARNER &
ELIZABETH CLEMMER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DANGER TO POLICE IN DOMESTIC DISTUR-

BANCES-A NEW LOOK (1986); Craig Uchida et al., Danger to Police During Domestic Encounters: Assaults on Baltimore County Police, 1984-86, 2 CRIM. JUST. POL'y REV. 357, 365;
Rosemary Stanford & Bonney Lee Mowry, Domestic DisturbanceDanger Rate, 17 J. POLICE
ScI. & ADMIN. 244 (1990).
57 SHERMAN, supra note 9.
58 See DonaldJ. Black & AlbertJ. Reiss, Patternsof Behavior in Police and Citizen Transac-

tions, in, STUDIES

IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS

(Field

Surveys III, Vol. 2, 1967). See also ALBERTJ. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971);
Black, supra note 52.
59 BLACK, supra note 52, at 90.

60 Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street-LevelJustice: Situational Determinants of
Police Arrest Decisions, 29 Soc. PROB. 167, 170 (1981).
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of observed encounters in the summer of 1977, police in three metropolitan
areas chose not to make an arrestin eighty-threepercent of the cases where there
was legal basis to do so. Even where the suspect and victim were strangers, police failed to make arrests in sixty-six percent of the cases
(compared to eighty-three percent of cases where the parties were
acquainted).
Observation studies have also witnessed police officers ignoring
burglary, larceny, malicious destruction of property, drunk driving,
hit and run accidents, and a broad range of other offenses. 61 If
there is a police agency that practices full enforcement anywhere in
this country, researchers have yet to find it.
B.

DOING SOMETHING: MEDIATION VS. ARREST

In the late 1960s, clinical psychologists like Professor Morton
Bard recommended that police try to do more than walk away from
domestic calls. 6 2 They developed and trained officers in techniques
of conflict mediation, a concept later found offensive by those who
see assault as crime, not "conflict." These techniques taught police
to be more on-the-spot marriage counselors than assessors of possible law breaking. The techniques quite sensibly included separation
of the man and woman from each other and, if possible, other members of the household. Each party would then be able to give the
officer her or his version of what happened without fear of being
contradicted by the other party, leading to more shouting or worse.
After hearing the two versions, police were supposed to consult with
each other to discuss alternative actions. A preferred method was to
get the two parties to calm down, sit down, and rationally discuss
what would happen next. If that was not possible, officers would
often advise one of the parties to leave for a cooling off period. Another option Bard stressed was referral to counseling or other social
service agencies. Consistent with past practice, arrest was reserved
for cases of serious injury or assaults on police.
This training resulted in some cities in a decrease in arrests.
Some training explicitly made this a goal. This 1977 observation of
a police encounter shows how the mediation training was carried
out in many cases:
The officer received a call for family trouble. A woman met us at the
door. She was crying and very upset. She had some bruises on her
face and her lip was swollen and bleeding. She said that her husband
61 BLACK, supra note 52, at 185; MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 182-220
(1981).
62 MORTON BARD, NAT'L INST. L. ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUST., TRAINING POLICE AS
SPECIALISTS IN FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION (1970).
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had hit her, that she was not going to take it any more, and that she
wanted him arrested. The officer had her sign a complaint form. At
this point the man upstairs began yelling and cursing at the woman. It
turned out that the man and the woman are not married but have been
living together for some time and have a small baby. The woman
thought that they were married, but the man is in the process of getting a divorce from his wife. The officer went upstairs [with the woman] to try to talk to the man who was very angry and yelled at the
woman and the officer. The officer threatened him with arrest. Finally, the officer shut the door to keep out the woman. She got very
upset and felt that the officer was taking the side of the man. The
back-up officer arrived and found the woman in the corner of the small
room, still crying. She told the second officer that she thought she was
legally married to the man. The officer told her that she could not be
legally married to him, since he was still legally married to his wife.
When the man came downstairs with the first officer, he said he was
going to his mother's house. The officer asked if everything would be
okay. The man said yes.6 3The woman remained sitting in the corner
crying. The officers left.
In this example, mediation was substituted for a legally valid
arrest. It also consisted primarily of a one-on-one discussion with
the suspect. As Professor Oppenlander's analysis of the 1977 data
points out, police discussions with one party are more frequent than
those that engage both parties simultaneously. Yet it is hard to call
such methods "mediation" if they do not involve consultation with
both parties about the solutions being reached, regardless of
whether there are face-to-face discussions.
In the majority of cases in which no crime has been committed,
mediation techniques might make a great deal of sense in the short
run. They are clearly focused on the immediate "crisis," and not on
any long-term pattern or future risks of violence in the relationship.
The implicit objective is to minimize the risk of harm while police
are present at the scene, rather than to prevent a recurrence of violence. Since police mishandling of interpersonal relationships in
the encounter can arguably escalate the risk of violence rather than
6 4
defuse it, their mediation skills are important targets for training.
Whether accomplishing the objective of minimizing violence at the
police encounter will reduce domestic violence overall, however, is
debatable. Unfortunately, no rigorous evaluation of mediation
training was ever done that adequately addressed the key question
of violence reduction.
The mediation approach also hypothesized that arrest should
be avoided, even when a misdemeanor had been committed, be63 Oppenlander, supra note 51, at 460-61.
64 BARD, supra note 62.
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cause of the danger that arrest might backfire. This reflected a
widespread belief among police at that time. As one observer summarized the views of police he interviewed:
An arrest in a family squabble does not resolve the underlying
problems, and it may simply aggravate matters, especially if the husband is arrested. He will eventually get out ofjail, and he
may return
65
home, angrier than before, to pick up where he left off.

In the 1970s, however, women's advocates clearly rejected that
hypothesis. As Joan Zorza's article in the present volume amply
documents, the women's movement adopted a full enforcement position. This position implicitly hypothesizes that more arrests (and
prosecution, and sentencing) would help to reduce male violence in
the home against women. The first line of attack on police underenforcement was through litigation. But litigation alone could not
address the underlying statutory problem of the in-presence requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests. Accordingly, legislation was sought and obtained in several states in the late 1970s
granting a specific exception to the in-presence requirement for domestic violence misdemeanors. One of the states in which this occurred was Minnesota, in 1978. Predictably, however, Minnesota
police made little use of the expanded arrest powers that the legis66
lature had granted them.
In this context, a controlled experiment was clearly justified
under Federal Judicial Center guidelines. 67 Practitioners had great
uncertainty about a proposed innovation they were being asked to
adopt, an innovation in practice if not in black letter law. Two competing hypotheses about the effects of arrest, at least in specific
cases, could be set against each other on the criterion measure of
repeat domestic violence. While a controlled experiment in arrest
would not be able to address the general deterrent effects of arrest, it
could examine the specific deterrent effects in which individual victims would have the greatest personal stake. Fortunately, Minneapolis appointed a new police chief in 1980, Anthony V. Bouza, who
was willing to undertake the risk of conducting the first random assignment experiment in field arrests.
65 BROWN, supra note 61, at 204.
66 Joan Potter, The Police and the
MAC. 40.
67 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTrER,

Battered Wife: The Searchfor Understanding, I

supra note 40.
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THE MINNEAPOLIS EXPERIMENT

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

In order to find which police approach was most effective in
deterring future domestic violence by the same offender against the
same victim, the Police Foundation and the Minneapolis Police Department agreed to conduct a controlled experiment with the support of the National Institute of Justice. 68 The design of the
experiment called for a lottery selection of three treatments for all
suspects legally eligible for arrest under the 1978 Minnesota warrantless arrest statute. The lottery selection, as noted above, minimized the pre-existing differences among the three groups of
suspects, and helped eliminate any other possible cause of observed
differences in repeat violence rates besides the three treatments
themselves. The treatments included the following:
1. arrest (with at least one night in jail)
2. sending the suspect away from the scene of the assault for eight
hours (or arresting the suspects if they refused)
3. giving the couple some form
of advice, which could include media69
tion at an officer's discretion.
The criterion for comparing the relative success of the three treatments was the frequency and seriousness of any future domestic violence over the next six months.
The experiment involved only simple (misdemeanor) domestic
assaults, where both the suspect and the victim were present when
the police arrived. Thus, the experiment included only those cases
in which police were empowered, but not required, to make arrests.
The police officer needed to have probable cause to believe that a
cohabitant or spouse had assaulted the victim within the past four
hours. Police did not need to witness the assault. Cases of lifethreatening or severe injury, usually labeled as felonies (aggravated
assault), were excluded from the design. So were cases in which the
victim demanded an arrest, cases in which a court order of protection was in effect, cases in which the suspect assaulted a police officer, or any case in which a police officer believed an arrest was
necessary due to an imminent threat of harm to the victim.
68 Sherman & Berk, supra note 5.
69 After meeting with the experimental officers for two days, the principal investigators decided that no greater homogeneity of a "mediation" treatment was feasible in the
circumstances. This weak test of "mediation" was arguably typical for police departments at that time. See OPPENLANDER, supra note 51. On the other hand, it created a bias
against the success of a non-arrest compliance treatment. See AlbertJ. Reiss, Consequences
of Compliance and DeterrenceModels of Law Enforcement Forthe Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 L.
& CONT. PROB. 106 (1984).
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The design called for each participating officer-all of whom
were volunteers-to carry a pad of report forms, color coded for the
three different police responses. Each time the officers encountered
a situation that fit the experiment's criteria, they were to take
whatever action was indicated by the top report form on the pad.
The forms were numbered and arranged for each officer in an order
determined by the lottery. The consistency of the lottery assignment was to be monitored by research staff observers riding on patrol for a sample of evenings. After a police action was taken at the
scene of a domestic violence incident, the officer was to fill out a
brief report and give it to the research staff for follow-up. As a further check on the lottery process, the staff logged in the reports in
the order in which they were received and made sure that the sequence corresponded to the original assignment of responses.
The experiment employed two key measures of repeat violence:
official police records and victim interviews. A predominantly minority, female research staff was employed to contact the victims for
a detailed, face-to-face interview, to be followed by telephone follow-up-interviews every two weeks for twenty-four weeks. The interviews were designed primarily to measure the frequency and
seriousness of victimizations caused by a suspect after police intervention. The research staff also collected criminal justice reports
that mentioned suspect's names during the six-month follow-up
period.
As is common in field experiments, the actual research process
in Minneapolis differed somewhat from the original plan. None of
these differences, however, seriously threatened the experiment's
validity. There is little doubt that many of the officers occasionally
failed to follow fully the experimental design. Some of the failures
were due to forgetfulness, such as when officers left report pads at
home or at the police station. Other failures stemmed from confusion over whether the experiment applied in certain situations.
Whether any officer intentionally subverted the design is unclear.
The plan to monitor the lottery process with ride-along observers
broke down because of the unexpectedly low frequency of cases
meeting the experimental criteria, a problem that also affected the
replications. Thus, the possibility existed that police officers finding
the upcoming experimental treatment unpalatable may have occasionally decided to ignore the experiment. They may have chosen,
in effect, to exclude certain cases in violation of the experimental
design. Such action would have biased the selection of the experiment's sample of cases, but not the results of the experiment among
the cases included.
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Moreover, the plans assumed that there would be legitimate
reasons why the three treatments were not always delivered as
designed. Ninety-nine percent of the suspects targeted for arrest
actually were arrested; seventy-eight percent of those scheduled to
receive advice did; and seventy-three percent of those who were to
be sent out of the residence for eight hours actually were sent (most
of those who were not were arrested, as planned). One explanation
for this pattern, consistent with experimental guidelines, is that mediating and sending off were more difficult ways for police to control
a situation.
This pattern could have biased estimates of the relative effectiveness of arrest by removing uncooperative and difficult offenders
from mediation and separation treatments. Any deterrent effect of
arrest could be underestimated and, in the extreme, arrest could be
shown to increase the chance of repeat violence. In effect, the arrest
group could have received too many "bad risks" relative to the
other treatments. Fortunately, Professor Berk's statistical analysis
of this process shows that the delivered treatments conformed very
70
closely to the experimental design, with no problems of bias.
More substantial problems arose with the interviews of victims.
The majority of the victims could not be followed up for the full six
months, and less than two-thirds even granted an initial interview.
Many of the victims simply could not be found, either for the initial
interview or for the follow-ups. They had left town, moved somewhere else, or refused to answer the phone or doorbell. The research staff made up to twenty attempts to contact these victims and
often employed investigative techniques (asking friends and neighbors) to find them. Sometimes these methods worked, only to have
the victim give an outright refusal, or break one or more appointments to meet the interviewer at a "safe" location for the interview.
Fortunately, the experimental treatment assigned to the offender
did not affect the victim's decision to grant initial interviews. Statistical tests showed the victims' willingness to give interviews did not
depend upon what police did, the race of the victim, or the race of
the offender.
Despite these limitations, the experiment succeeded in producing an experimental sample of 314 cases with complete official outcome measures and an apparently unbiased sample of responses
from the victims in those cases.
70 Sherman & Berk, supra note 5.
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RESULTS

Consistent with the kinds of cases coming to police attention in
most big cities, the sample contained a disproportionate number of
unmarried couples with lower than average educational levels, minority couples, and couples who were very likely to have had prior
violent incidents with police intervention. The sixty percent unemployment rate among the experiments's suspects was strikingly high.
The suspects' fifty-nine percent prior arrest rate was also strikingly
high, suggesting (with the eighty percent prior domestic assault
rate) that the suspects generally were experienced law-breakers who
were accustomed to police interventions. But with the exception of
the heavy representation of Native-Americans due to Minneapolis'
proximity to many Indian reservations, many of the sample's characteristics were probably close to those of domestic violence cases
coming to police attention in other large U.S. cities.
The results, based on both official records and victim interviews, showed that arrest produced the lowest prevalence of repeat
violence of any of the three treatments. The results taken from the
police records on subsequent violence showed ten percent of the
arrested suspects with at least one repeat incident, nineteen percent
of the advised suspects, and twenty-four percent of the suspects sent
away for eight hours. The arrest treatment was clearly an improvement over sending the suspect away, which produced two and a half
times as many repeat incidents as arrest. The advise treatment was
statistically not distinguishable from the other two police actions.
The victim interviews showed a somewhat different picture. According to the victims' reports of repeat violence, nineteen percent
of the suspects in the arrest group, thirty-three percent of those in
the send group, and thirty-seven percent of those in the advise group
committed at least one repeat attack on the victims (defined as including assaults, threats or property damage). This ranking varies
from the official measure results by reversing the send and advise
groups. In this measure, sending the suspect away produced results
that were not statistically distinguishable from the results of the
other two actions. It is not clear why the order of the three levels of
repeat violence was different for these two ways of measuring the
violence. But it is clear that arrest worked best by either measure, at
least in comparison to the two most common police alternatives as
they were currently practiced by patrol officers. This does not mean
that arrest was be superior to more powerful alternatives; it only
means that it worked better than the alternatives then in use.
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LIMITATIONS

The experiment generally won high praise for the quality of the
research design. It has been described as "a landmark study," 7 1 and
as "arguably the best field experiment on a criminal justice policy
problem to date." 72 Nonetheless, the study had a number of limitations, many of which were pointed out by the authors, and some of
73
which were later identified by other commentators.
Perhaps the most important limitation was that the study was
unable to say why arrest had the lowest rate of repeat violence.
While the authors presented it as a specific deterrent effect, it may
also have been a displacement effect, meaning that the suspects
moved on to abuse new victims.

74

The low completion rate of vic-

tim interviews also made it difficult to estimate the rate of breakup
in relationships across treatment groups, which may also have reduced the risk of repeat violence. It was, however, large enough to
refute the hypothesis that arrested suspects' victims were intimidated into remaining silent about new violence, since the interview
completion rates did not vary by treatment group.
The study's summary report for practitioners identified several
problems involved in generalizing from the study's results to other
cities. 7 5 One was the sample size, which was too small to yield information regarding the possibility of different effects among different
kinds of people. Another was the automatic night in jail attendant
to domestic violence arrest in Minneapolis, which is not true of all
cities; without it, a deterrent effect might not be achieved. A third
was the unusual combination of sixteen percent Native-American
and thirty-six percent African-American suspects in the sample,
which might not allow generalization to cities with, say, large proportions of Hispanics. A fourth was the fact that interviewers attempted to contact all the victims, which attention might have
artificially enhanced the effects of the police actions.
Other critics have attacked the methods of analysis used in the
original report, 76 although a subsequent analysis addressed the
purely statistical issues and found similar results no matter how the
71 Delbert S. Elliott, CriminalJustice Procedures in Family Violence Crimes, in FAMILY VIOLENCE: 11 CRIME & JUsTICE 458 (Llloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989).

72 Professor Richard Lempert, quoted in Sherman & Cohn, supra note 4, at 118.
73 For a full review of the limitations, see SHERMAN, supra note 9, ch. 4.
74 AlbertJ. Reiss, Some Failures in Designing Data Collection That Distort Results, in COLLECTING EVALUATION DATA: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 161 (Leigh Burstein et al., eds.,
1985).
75 Lawrence Sherman & Richard Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, I
POLICE FOUND. REP. 7 (1984).
76 Binder & Meeker, supra note 13.

1992]

INFLUENCE OF CRIMINOLOGY

data were analyzed. 7 7 The major debate about the limitations of the
experiment concerned its appropriateness for serving as the basis of
any national policy recommendations. One commentary, for example, called the experiment a mere "pilot study," and described using
its results for national policy-making as "foolishness bordering on
irresponsibility." 7 8 Another suggested that the limitations implied a
need for "some caution in rushing to a policy recommendation on
the strength of these findings alone."' 79 These comments raise the
distinct questions of what the authors actually recommended on the
basis of the results, and what others recommended on the basis of
the findings that the authors actively helped to publicize.
D.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The authors actually recommended three policies.8 0 One was
that the estimated twenty-two states then barring warrantless arrest
for misdemeanor domestic violence not committed in the officer's
presence change their laws to allow such arrests. 8' This recommendation seemed to be amply supported by the research, and was the
least controversial among both researchers leaning against drawing
strong inferences from the study and women's advocates leaning in
favor of drawing strong inferences. Professor Lempert, the first to
call for caution in making innovations based on the results, concurred that "if I were a police chief I would change a 'do not arrest'
policy because of the study's results, although I would not mandate
82
arrest."
The Minneapolis experiment's authors concurred in cautioning
against mandatory arrest, although they did write that, "on the basis
of this study alone, police should probably employ arrest in most
cases of minor domestic violence." 8 3 They went on to cite the Minneapolis police department's policy (which I drafted) as the kind
that "did not make arrest 100 percent mandatory. The policy did,
however, require officers to file a written report explaining why they
failed to make an arrest when it was legally possible to do so."84
The authors' opposition to mandatory arrest statutes stemmed primarily from the study's small sample size. This meant that, "beBerk & Sherman, supra note 6.
Binder & Meeker, supra note 13, at 354.
79 Elliott, supra note 71, at 454.
80 Sherman & Berk, supra note 75.
77
78

81 Lisa G. Lerman & Franci Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic
SPONSE 1 (1983).
82 Lempert, Humility is a Virtue, supra
83 Sherman & Berk, supra note 75.
84 Id.

note 13, at 158.
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cause of the relatively small numbers of suspects in each
subcategory (age, race, employment status, criminal history, etc.), it
is possible that this experiment failed to discover that for some
kinds of people, arrest may only make matters worse. Until subsequent research addresses the issue more thoroughly, it would be
premature for state legislatures to pass laws requiring arrests in all
misdemeanor domestic assaults." 8 5
In making this recommendation, the authors ran afoul of both
academic critics and women's advocates. The academic critics argued, in the spirit of the FederalJudicial Center guidelines, that the
experiment had too many limitations to justify a national policy innovation in the direction of greater severity. 86 Women's advocates,
in contrast, generally argued that the research showed the value of
arrest, and that police would not make more arrests without a state
statute requiring it.87 Having offended critics on both ends of the
spectrum, the authors may claim to have taken the middle road.
And judging by the standards for the approval of new drugs by the
FDA, the case can be made that the Minneapolis experiment would
have been sufficient evidence for the FDA to approve a "preferred
arrest" policy of the kind the authors recommended. 8 8
The FDA analogy breaks down, however, with the authors'
third recommendation: that the Minneapolis experiment be replicated in other cities. It appears to be unusual for randomized
clinical trials to continue after the FDA has authorized a new drug,
in part because it would mean withholding a treatment of proven
effectiveness from a patient in need.8 9 This was the position taken
by some opponents of the Minneapolis replication program, who
argued for leaving well enough alone. 90 The authors again took a
middle ground, suggesting that the research results should be used
provisionally. The authors stressed that more research was needed
to insure that the findings would apply to other cities and that arrest
would not create more violence among any particular subgroups.
As the results reported in this Symposium issue demonstrate, both
concerns were valid.
85

Id.

86 Binder & Meeker, supra note 13; Lempert, supra note 13.
87 See Zorza, supra note 10.

88 Sherman & Cohn, supra note 4, at 136.
89 Id.

90 Personal communication from Deputy Inspector DeanJ. Collins, Milwaukee Police
Department, concerning lobbying against Milwaukee Common Council approval of the
Milwaukee domestic violence experiment, August, 1986. The Common Council subsequently gave the experiment unanimous approval.
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THE EXPERIMENT'S INFLUENCE

It is not clear exactly how much influence the experiment had in
changing police policies and state laws, nor is it clear that those
changes created substantial changes in police practice. What is clear
is that the policies and laws governing police responses to domestic
violence underwent a radical change in the years following the extensive publicity reporting the experiment's results.
In 1984, on the eve of the announcement of the final Minneapolis results, a national telephone survey of a sample of police departments serving cities of over 100,000 found that only ten percent of
them encouraged their police officers to make arrests in misdemeanor domestic violence cases. By 1986, a repeat survey found
that forty-six percent of a (slightly different) sample of those cities
encouraged arrest in those circumstances. There is some evidence
that cities were more likely to have made that change if the respondents could properly identify the results of the Minneapolis experiment, but some might read those results as showing only a modest
direct influence of the experiment on policy. 91
What may have had greater influence on the policy change was
the highly publicized $2.5 million jury verdict against the Torrington, Connecticut Police Department for repeatedly failing to
make arrests of an abusive husband who ultimately caused serious
injury to his wife, Tracey Thurman. 92 The threat of civil liability is
often mentioned when police discuss this issue, even among police
officers who have never heard of the Minneapolis experiment. The
indirect influence of the experiment, however, might have come
from Professor James Fyfe, who cited its findings as an expert wit93
ness testifying on behalf of plaintiff.

Whatever the relative contributions of the experiment, the Duluth mandatory arrest demonstration project, 94 the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence, 95 documentary and
dramatized television programs, and other attention paid to the issue in the mid-1980s, police policies continued to change. By 1989,
a sample of big city police agencies found that eighty-four percent
had adopted at least a preferred arrest policy, and seventy-six per91 Sherman & Cohn, supra note 4, at 125.
92 A.P., Officers Must Pay $2.3 Million to Wife Maimed by Husband, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1985, B6.
93 SHERMAN, supra note 9, at ch. 5.
94 Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at § 6 (mag.) 23.
This article about mandatory arrest nationally attributes great influence to the (unevaluated) Duluth project, and makes no mention of the Minneapolis experiment.
95 Supra note 7.
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cent had adopted mandatory arrest policies. 9 6 A sample of rural
and urban police agencies in 1988 found that the Minneapolis experiment was ranked last among eight possible influences on police
policies for domestic violence, but the authors of that survey argued
that the experiment had indirect influence through lobbying on
state legislatures. 9 7 Whatever the influence on the state legislatures,
all but one of the fifteen states with mandatory arrest statutes
adopted them in the period after the Minneapolis experiment was
released. 9 8
In recommending against such mandatory arrest laws and policies, the authors of the Minneapolis experiment warned that such
laws would merely "invite circumvention" by police officers resistant to policy constraints. 9 9 According to the available research on
the implementation of such policies, that is generally what happened. Professor Ferraro's study of the Phoenix Police Department's field practices after the adoption of a mandatory arrest policy
found that police made arrests in only forty-three percent of the
cases where there was probable cause and the offender was present. 10 0 Professor Balos, in her review of police compliance with the
Minnesota mandatory arrest statute for violations of court orders of
protection (about which the Minneapolis experiment was silent),
found that police in Hennepin County, which includes Minneapolis,
made arrests in only twenty-two percent of the cases where arrest
was required by state law. 01o Only Milwaukee, of all cities studied to
date, appears to have achieved a high level of compliance with a
mandatory arrest policy.' 0 2 Yet despite the resistance to full implementation of these policies, the national arrest rate for all simple
assaults (most of which are probably domestic) rose by seventy percent from 1985 to 1989.103 In states where such laws were passed,
moreover, it became legally impossible to replicate the Minneapolis
experiment with a control group of non-arrested suspects, regardless of the defacto circumvention.
Fortunately, misdemeanor domestic violence arrests remained
96 J. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison III, Police-PreferredArrest Policies, in

WOMAN

59 (Michael Steinman, ed., 1991).
Meeker & Binder, supra note 13, at 151.

BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES
97

98 NATIONAL
CHART

CENTER ON WOMEN

AND

FAMILY LAW, MANDATORY ARREST SUMMARY

(1991).

99 Sherman & Berk, supra note 5, at 270.

100 KathleenJ. Ferraro, Policing Woman Battering, 36 Soc. PROB. 61, 63-64 (1989).
10 1 Beverly Balos & Katie Trotzky, Enforcement of the Domestic Abuse Act in Minnesota: A
Preliminaiy Study, 6 LAW & INEQUALITY 83, 103 (1988).
102 SHERMAN, supra note 9, chapter 5.
103

Computations from FBI data reported in Sherman, supra, note 9, Figure 5.1.
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legally discretionary in enough states to allow the National Institute
of Justice to sponsor a series of replications of the experimentperhaps the clearest and most direct influence of the Minneapolis
experiment on public policy.
V.

THE REPLICATIONS

The five completed replications of the Minneapolis experiment
have produced two key findings. One finding is that, in cases of
arrest for probable cause, misdemeanor domestic assault has different effects in different cities. Specifically, the results in three cities
(including Minneapolis) show evidence of a deterrent effect, while
those in three others show evidence of increased violence overall.
The second finding is that such arrests have different effects on different kinds of people, with a consistent variation depending on the
employment status of the suspect. Employed suspects tend to be
deterred by arrest, while unemployed suspects tend to become more
frequently violent following arrest. These findings are drawn from
the six experiments funded to replicate the Minneapolis experiment, all but one of which (Atlanta) has produced research reports
0
as of this writing.'

4

Understanding these results requires some appreciation of the
differences among the experiments in their research designs and
their implementation, as well as some of the possible reasons for the
findings. It also requires special attention to the details of the
Metro-Dade (Miami) experiment, which alone among the completed
experiments is not reported by its authors in this volume.10 5 Finally,
the question of what influence the replications have had on the
criminal law to date reveals important differences between them and
the Minneapolis experiment.
A.

RESEARCH DESIGNS

None of the replications was an exact reproduction of the Minneapolis research design. Rather than slavishly following the model
of the physical sciences, the new experiments all improved upon the
Minneapolis design in basic ways, and most of them tested different
104 See articles in this Symposium issue, as well as Franklyn Dunford et al., The Role of

Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLGY 183 (1990);J. DAVID
HIRSCHEL, ET AL.,

CHARLOTTE SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT,

1990); Anthony M. Pate et al., Metro-Dade Spouse Abuse Replication
Project Draft FinalReport (NAT'L INST. OF JUST., 1991); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., From
(NAT'L INST. OF JUST.,

Initial Deterrence to Long-Term Escalation: Short-Custody Arrestfor Poverty Ghetto Domestic Vio-

lence, 29

CRIMINOLGY

821 (1991).

105 This unfortunate lacuna is not due to the lack of an invitation.
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combinations of treatments against arrest. These changes in research design made the results arguably more powerful and interesting. The cost of those benefits, however, is some complication in
our ability to make direct comparisons and draw conclusions across
the studies.
The most basic improvement was the separation of police
screening of cases for eligibility in the experiment from the application of the randomized treatment. That is, all five replications assigned the treatments after the police officer declared the cases
eligible, and the officers had no idea of what the treatment would be
at the time they made the eligibility decision. This was a potential
problem inherent in the use of the color-coded report sheets that
officers were issued in Minneapolis, due to the possible bias it could
introduce into the officers' decision to include a case in the experiment. A "nice" suspect, for example, might have been excluded if
the officer knew that arrest was the next treatment in his randomized sequence. By requiring officers to call headquarters to find out
the treatment, the design greatly reduced the potential for such bias
in sample selection.
Another improvement benefiting all but Omaha was a substantial increase in funding to allow much larger sample sizes. The
larger sample sizes had several benefits. One was an increased
number of treatments that could be tested in some experiments
(Miami and Colorado Springs). Another was greater statistical
power for examining different effects of arrest on different types of
suspects. A third was greater power overall for detecting effects of
arrest that are less substantial than the large differences found in
Minneapolis.
The treatment innovations responded well to Professor Reiss's
10 6
comment about comparing arrest to rather weak alternatives.
The Colorado Springs experiment included immediate counseling
at police headquarters, as well as police issuance at the scene of an
emergency protection order legally ejecting the offender from the
premises. The Metro-Dade experiment compared arrest with and
without followup police counseling some days later to no arrest with
and without counseling. The Charlotte experiment compared arrest
to a ticket-style citation at the scene, which did not require the suspect to leave. Milwaukee pursued the question of jail time associated with arrest, randomly assigning three-hour and twelve-hour
arrests to see what difference the variations in jail time across police
agencies might make in the generalizability of the findings. Only
106 See Reiss, supra note 69.
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Omaha repeated the three Minneapolis alternatives, providing the
closest replication of any of the five.
Eligibility criteria varied somewhat, sometimes unavoidably. In
Metro-Dade, for example, warrantless arrest was illegal for unmarried couples, even if they were cohabiting, until near the end of the
experiment. Thus, their sample has the highest proportion of married couples (79%) of any of the experiments, although it was
closely followed by the sixty-nine percent married couples in the
Colorado Springs sample-the only two experiments with a majority
of married couples.' 0 7 The inclusion of non-spouse-like cases, such
as homosexual lovers and other cohabitants, an issue raised by Ms.
Zorza in this symposium, represented a trivial difference across the
cities. While Charlotte, Colorado Springs and Metro-Dade excluded such cases, they constituted only eight percent of cases in
Milwaukee, ten percent of cases in Omaha, and fifteen percent of
the cases in Minneapolis. 10 8 Alone among the six experiments,
Charlotte excluded male victims entirely.
Perhaps the most striking difference was in the legal threshold
of eligibility. While misdemeanor assault (or battery) was the only
offense eligible in four of the experiments, Omaha and Colorado
Springs accepted other "domestic" offenses. Such cases constituted
only twenty-three percent of the Omaha cases, but they constituted
over half (59%) of the Colorado Springs cases.' 0 9 It is not dear,
then, that the Colorado Springs results are directly comparable to
the other experiments, since most of its cases involved criminal
"harassment" without evidence of physical contact. One experimental case I observed in Colorado Springs led to the arrest of a
man who had been assaulted by a woman, on the rationale that he
had come to her apartment that evening against her wishes. Under
such circumstances in the Milwaukee experiment, and probably elsewhere, the woman would have been the experiment's suspect.
These variations, however, are also largely true of the police
environment to which the results of these experiments must be generalized if they are to inform policymaking. What all six experiments had in common was that they all randomly assigned arrest
and some sort of non-arrest. This alone made them among the
most comparable studies of the effects of police practices ever
undertaken.
107

Pate, et al, supra note 104;

SALLY FREELS & ROBERT F. BORUCH, CROSS-SITE DATA

REPORT, SPOUSE ASSAULT REPLICATION PROJECT

108 Id.
109 Id.

12

(NAT'L INST. OFJUST., Jan.

26, 1990).

LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN
B.

[Vol. 83

IMPLEMENTATION

The comparability of results was further limited, however, by
the diversity in actual implementation of the experiments. Table 1
summarizes these differences, along with the differences in the design elements. The Table reveals how much information we still
lack on some key aspects of comparability of the experiments, such
as the length of time arrestees are held in custody. Most of the important characteristics for comparison of the designs have been reported, however. They show great variance on some issues, and
much less on others. What is most striking is that there is no consistent difference in any of these characteristics that matches the division of the six experiments into the two different substantive
findings of deterrence or escalation effects.
The greatest variation across the experiments was in the demographic characteristics of the samples, which is exactly what the Minneapolis authors had recommended. Such variations helped to
reveal whether arrest would have the same effects in different kinds
of cities.
What was less variable, although far from consistent, was the
nature of the arrest treatment. While the average number of hours
spent in custody after arrest varied in percentage terms, it was generally reported to be in the range of nine to fifteen hours. Judging
by the relatively small difference between the effects of short (three
hour) and long (twelve hour) arrest in Milwaukee, these variations
in custody time made little difference-assuming that they were
measured accurately, which may not have been the case.' 10 Greater
variability is found in the percentage of suspects who were handcuffed during arrest. While generally high where it was reported,
Table 1 shows that Colorado Springs was again extremely different
from the other experiments in having a rate of handcuffing fourfifths lower than those in the other cities. The greatest variability is
found in the percentage of cases with prosecution leading to convictions and some sort of sentence which ranged from one percent in
Milwaukee to sixty-four percent in Omaha. While the Minneapolis
experiment, which had four percent convictions, could eliminate
prosecution as a contributing influence on the effects of arrest, that
was clearly not the case in Charlotte and Omaha.
More reassuring from a research design standpoint is that all six
experiments had relatively high levels of compliance with the randomized designs. All of them improved on the Minneapolis compliance rate of eighty-two percent, ranging up to the Milwaukee rate of
110 Sherman, et al., supra note 104, at 845.
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TABLE 1
DESIGN VARIATIONS IN

Six

ARREST EXPERIMENTS

Escalation Effect Cities

Deterrent Effect Cities
Design
Elements
Custody Time (hours)
Suspects Handcuffed
Suspects Convicted
Treated as Randomized
Married couples
Black suspects
White & Hispanic
Victims
Suspects Unemployed
High-Crime Area
Sample
Sample Sizes
Victims (6 mos+)
Interviewed
Victim Medical
Treatment

a

Colorado
Springs

Omaha
16

Charlotte
9

64%
92%
42%
43%

80%
28%
84%
50%
70%

82%
35%
36%

90%
79%
42%

87%
69%
31%

Milwaukee
2 and 12
96%
1%
98%
30%
75%

57%
60%

60%
29%

71%
30%

28%
47%

59%
31%

30%
22%

Yes
314

No
907

No
1658

Yes
1200

No
330

No
650

23%

42%

58%

79%

73%

50%

?

?

13%

19%

4%

Minneapolis
24+

Miami
14.6
93%

22%

4%

Key: information not reported = ?
'LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

(1992).

ninety-eight percent. While none of the experiments is perfect, in
the historical experience of both medical and criminological experiments the compliance levels are substantial.
The most important methodological question, however, is
whether the misassignment rate exceeded the base rate of recidivism, since that could severely distort an analysis of the results according to how each case was supposed to have been treated, rather
than to what actually happened.'I' That approach to analysis is the
standard for medical experiments, and was the method NIJ instructed the replication experiments to employ in the analyses summarized in Tables I and 2. Based on the current reports alone, it is
impossible to tell how much statistical power each experiment may
have lost from a high ratio of recidivism to the misapplication of
randomly assigned treatments.
What is easier and equally important to assess is the effect of
differences in response rates to the six-month followup victim interviews. These varied from twenty-three percent in Minneapolis to
the seventy percent range in Omaha and Milwaukee. Where the response rates were under sixty percent (Charlotte, Metro-Dade, and
III Gerald S. Weinstein & Bruce Levin, Effect of Crossover on the Statistical Power of Randomized Studies, 48 ANN. THORACIC SURG. 137 (1989).
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2

SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF SIX IMMEDIATE ARREST
EXPERIMENTS, SAME VICTIMa

Finding

City
Minneapolis Omaha Charlotte Milwaukee Col.Sprs. Miami

6 month deterrence official
measures

yes

no

no

no

no

1 of 2

6 month deterrence victim

yes

border

no

no

yes

yes

interviews
6-12 month escalation official
measures

no

yes

yes

yes

no

no

-

no

no

no

no

no

yes

no

no

yes

no

1 of 2

yes

border

no

yes

-

yes

border

-

yes

yes

-

6-12 month escalation victim
interviews
30-60 day deterrence official
measures, any or same
victim
30-60 day deterrence, victim
interviews
Escalation effect for

-

yes

-

-

yes

-

yes

unemployed
Deterrence for employed

Key: relationship not reported
'LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

-

(1992).

Colorado Springs), there is a substantial likelihood of the interview
sample having substantively different characteristics from the full
sample. At the very least, this may account for any differences between the victim interviews and official records, which were found in
all three replication cities with low response rates.
C.

RESULTS

The replication results, just like the Minneapolis results, were
examined in several different ways. The logic of employing multiple
analyses is to increase our confidence in results that are consistent
across different approaches and criteria. The difficulty this approach can create, however, is in the interpretation of conflicting
results even within experiments. As Table 2 summarizes, that is
what occurred in almost all of the replications.
One of the key questions about a treatment is how long the effects last. As Table 2 shows, there was evidence of short-term deterrence followed by a longer-term decay in Milwaukee, and evidence
that the effects of arrest worsened over time in both Omaha and
Charlotte. A major contribution of Dr. Dunford's article in this symposium, in fact, is his demonstration that the conventional sixmonth followup period, driven largely by funding agencies' needs to
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contain costs, can substantially distort the measurement of the treatment effects. It is not clear why the effects of arrest worsen over
time, but it is clear that the finding is not due to the idiosyncracies of
any one experiment.
Another difference in the results concerns the suspects' repeat
violence against the same victim or any other victim. The hypothesis that arrest displaces repeat violence onto new victims 1 12 has its
adherents, and so the Milwaukee experiment tested it. The results
of both approaches were essentially the same, but there was admittedly little deterrent effect to explain away with displacement. As
Table 2 shows, most of the other research reports stuck to the focus
of the Minneapolis design, which examined repeat violence only
against the same victim.
The most basic difference in the analysis of these results is the
method of measuring recidivism: official records versus victim interviews. Low response rates in the latter, however, can make these
two measures inappropriate for comparison. Even where response
rates are relatively high, they can still capture different populations.
For example, the sample represented in victim interviews might
generally consist of couples who are more socially bonded and
therefore easier to locate than those on the full sample captured by
official measures. This disparity produces some striking differences
in results between the official and interview measures, but in highly
consistent ways.
For example, all of the evidence of escalation effects are found in the
official data, and not in the victim interviews. The evidence in Omaha,
Milwaukee, and Charlotte that the arrested suspects became significantly more violent than those not arrested is only found in the full
samples, and not in the reduced portions of the sample granting
interviews. While this may be due to inherent differences between
interviews and official records, it is equally plausible that escalation
effects are more pronounced among the less socially bonded
couples who are harder to interyiew. It is also important that the
reader note this before reading the individual experimental reports,
since the authors do not put their own findings in the context of
these other results. Thus the Charlotte experiment reported in this
issue, for example, makes little of the significant escalation effect it
found in one measure because it was not confirmed by the other.
The replication of this difference in two other cities, however, gives
the finding much more prominence as a clue to the overall puzzle of
these diverse results.
112 See REIss, supra note 74.
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Another striking fact about the two different measures is that
interviews generally show better resultsfrom arrest than does official data. In
both Colorado Springs and Miami, for example, at least one official
measure shows no deterrent effect, while the victim interviews in
both cities show a clear deterrent effect. This is again consistent
with the hypothesis that the interviewed victims were different in
important respects from the full sample. It is somewhat complicated, however, by the appearance of a deterrent effect as measured
by one of the official measures in Miami.
These differences in the "main effects," or overall results for
each randomly assigned treatment group, may mask underlying differences in the effects of arrest within each group. Ideally, such differences would be hypothesized in advance and built into the
random assignment design by randomization within each subgroup, such as employed versus unemployed suspects. The political
difficulties of obtaining approval for such a design in 1986, however,
were insuperable. Thus, the experiments had an advance hypothesis that less socially bonded persons would react to arrest differently, 1 3 but the full statistical power of the research design was not
built around that hypothesis. This creates, in effect, some of the
same problems of correlation versus causation which randomized
experiments were designed to resolve. Some statisticians, however,
endorse such sub-analyses as merely constituting experiments
within experiments." 14
The results of these tests with regard to interaction effects are,
so far, consistently in support of the social bonding hypothesis.
Arrest has consistently more crime reduction effect on employed suspects than it
does on unemployed suspects. That is the good news. The bad news is
that the weaker a suspect's social bonds, the more likely it appears to be that
arrest will backfire by causing increased violence. The initial data analysis
demonstrating this effect is found in the article by Sherman and his
colleagues in this issue. That analysis was subsequently confirmed
with more powerful analytic techniques, which showed in particular
that the greatest escalation effect was among suspects who were
both unmarried and unemployed." 5 An identical analysis was performed on the Omaha data, which showed even stronger differences
(although not statistically significant ones, due to the smaller sample
113 Lawrence W. Sherman, Experiments in Police Discretion: Scientific Boon or Dangerous
Knowledge? 47 LAw & CONT. PROB. 61, 78 (1984).
114 Hans Zeisel, DisagreementOver the Evaluationof a Controlled Experiment, 88 AM.J. Soc.
378 (1982); Hans Zeisel, Hans Zeisel Concludes the Debate, 88 AM.J. Soc. 394 (1982).
115 Lawrence W. Sherman & Douglas A. Smith, Crime, Punishment and Stake in ConformiW: Legal and Extralegal Control of Domestic Violence, Am. Soc. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
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size). The interaction of unemployment and arrest was later replicated by Professor Berk and his colleagues, as reported in this symposium, although without taking marriage or other social bonding
indicators into account. Finally, this pattern is consistent with the
differences in Miami and Colorado Springs between the official and
victim interview recidivism data.
Whether the pattern of interaction between social bonds and
the effect of arrest holds up in Charlotte and Metro-Dade still remains to be seen. The fact that the interaction has been found in
three very different cities, however, is a strikingly consistent finding
no matter what the other experiments show. It demonstrates that in
at least some cities, arrest does have different effects on different
kinds of people. Under those conditions, it seems unlikely that the
FDA would approve the marketing of mandatory arrest for all
suspects.
Metro-Dade Details. While the statistical details of the other five
experiments are published and accessible either in this issue or elsewhere, that is not true of the Metro-Dade experiment. Therefore, a
full understanding of the replications is served by a brief summary
of the Miami-Dade details."16
The Miami Metro-Dade experiment randomly assigned four different treatments. Arrest and no arrest were each divided into two
groups: those with and without followup counseling by a special police unit. These followup visits occurred within about a week after
the call to police during which arrest was randomly assigned. There
were no significant differences associated with the counseling treatments. The effects of arrest in Miami are clearest when we collapse
the four groups into two, comparing all arrest cases to all non-arrest
cases.
The Miami victim interviews clearly show deterrent effects of
arrest, although we must recall that the victim interview response
rate of forty-two percent of the full sample suggested very different
characteristics of that sub-sample compared to the full sample of
907 cases on which official records were gathered. At the time of
the initial interview, eighteen percent of the non-arrest victims reported at least one incident in which the suspect hit, slapped, hurt,
or tried to hurt the victim. This compares to only ten percent of the
arrest group victims. The frequency differences are similar: a rate of
345 per 1,000 suspects in the non-arrest group, compared to 182 in
the arrest group. The differences in both measures are statistically
116 This section is taken from
Pate, et al., supra note 104.
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significant, reducing the risk of repeat violence by about half. At the
six month interviews, the prevalence effect was about the same.
Twenty-seven percent of the non-arrest victims were hurt at least
once compared to fifteen percent of the arrest group victims. The
frequency difference was also of the same magnitude: 527 repeat
incidents per 1,000 no-arrest suspects compared to 281 repeat incidents per 1,000 arrested suspects. These results were confirmed by
significant differences in the results of three different tests of time to
"failure," or the date of the first repeat incident of violence.
Repeat arrests for domestic violence also showed deterrent effects in Miami. While the number of repeat arrests in all groups was
low, the prevalence rates were still significantly different among the
suspects arrested and those not arrested. Out of the 465 arrested
suspects, five (1.1 %) were re-arrested for at least one new offense
against the same victims within six months. Among the 442 suspects randomly assigned to non-arrest, the comparable number was
seventeen (3.8%) subsequent arrests, or almost four times the prevalence rate. The difference in frequency was of about the same
magnitude as the difference in prevalence (although possibly due to
chance): twenty-two subsequent arrests per 1,000 arrested suspects,
compared to seventy-seven per 1,000 among the suspects not arrested. Once again, all three tests of the difference in average time
to first repeat offense showed significant benefits of arrest.
The one measure that showed no statistically significant difference was the offense reports naming the same suspect as the offender against the same victim. At six months, the prevalence rates
of this measure were almost identical for the arrest and non-arrest
suspects. This was true whether the repeat offense was aggravated
or non-aggravated battery, or if it was any other offense. The frequency of any offense, however, was still somewhat higher among
those suspects who had not been arrested (342 per 1,000) than
among those who had been (290 per 1,000). The time to first repeat
offense also showed no differences.
Why the two official measures should disagree is unclear,
although we can speculate that there was greater measurement error-or variability in police recordkeeping-in the offense reports
than in the arrest reports. Had they been combined, as they were in
Minneapolis, they would have probably shown no differences by
treatment, given the far greater volume of offense reports than of
arrests. Citing the Miami experiment as a strong confirmation of
the Minneapolis results must therefore be done with some caution.
Nonetheless, there is still support for positing a deterrent effect in at
least one official measure, and very strong, consistent support in all
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five ways of analyzing the victim data-consistent with the social
bonding hypothesis.
D.

EXPLAINING DIVERSE RESULTS

Unfortunately, the social bonding hypothesis does not yet fully
explain the differences in findings across cities. In order to give that
hypothesis a full and fair test, the raw data from all of the six experiments must be merged and analyzed together. Different combinations of risk factors, for example, must be calculated, such as
unmarried and unemployed (a category very rare in Colorado
Springs) versus married and unemployed. Since not all of the raw
data are yet publicly available, that analysis has not been possible.
When it is, however, it may allow an explanation of the diverse results that goes beyond a simple bivariate inspection of the demographic differences portrayed in Table 1.
Taken by itself, Table 1 shows no clear demographic correlates
between the deterrence and the escalation cities. Even where some
differences appear, they apply to only two out of three cases. For
example, the deterrent effect cities had a much lower average proportion of black suspects (38%) than the escalation effect cities
(63%o). The almost identical proportions of black suspects in escalation effect Omaha and deterrent-effect Miami, however, seriously
weakens race as an explanation for the diverse results. The raw data
might, however, reveal other characteristics correlated with race in
the different cities, which may in turn support a social bonds theory
or some other interpretation of differential reactions to domestic violence arrests.
One such characteristic, for example, may be the social structure of the community setting in which the suspects reside. Unemployment or social bonds may simply be a correlate of a more
powerful neighborhood effect on suspects' reactions to arrest. As
Professors Sampson and Wilson have observed, much social science
has a tendency towards the "individualistic fallacy" of assuming that
all causation is located in characteristics of individuals rather than of
their social settings. 1 7 Given the strong ecological correlates of
crime rates, it is equally plausible that there are structural characteristics of neighborhoods-such as the proportion of unemployed
males or of unmarried couples or of persons with criminal histories-that could determine how neighborhood residents react to
arrest for domestic violence.
117 RobertJ. Sampson & William J. Wilson, Race, Crime and Urban hequality, in CRIME
AND INEQUALITY (John L. Hagan, ed., forthcoming 1992).
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This hypothesis would predict very different effects of unemployment on arrest reactions in Colorado Springs, for example, and
in Milwaukee. The neighborhood proportions of unemployed persons, like the sample proportions reported in Table 1, are likely to
be far higher in Milwaukee than in Colorado Springs. Thus we
would expect more of an escalation or labeling effect in Milwaukee
than in Colorado Springs. Similarly, we would expect more of a deterrent effect of arrest among employed persons in Colorado
Springs than in Milwaukee, assuming the same ecological differences. As this issue reports, that is exactly what has been found to
date. What remains to be done is to collect census tract and block
level data for all the cases in the six experiments and test the ecological hypothesis. While such an analysis may be years in coming, it
would be well worth the investment in unraveling the puzzle of the
diverse results.
VI.

THE SYMPOSIUM ISSUE

The main articles in this symposium make several contributions
to the evolution of our knowledge about policing domestic violence.
The gracious agreement of the authors to prepare papers for the
issue has led, for the first time, to an assembly in one place of the
original reports of research on most of the experiments. This will
greatly simplify the task of policymakers and advisors seeking to digest the findings of the entire research program, and it will increase
the odds that criminology may have an appropriate influence on the
criminal law. The many requests for information on the experiments from state legislative counsel, even while the issue was in
preparation, suggests the great need for such a compendium.
This symposium also allows comparison of the ways in which
different researchers interpret the same data. The authors of
neither the Omaha nor the Charlotte report would say that their
experiments found that arrest caused an overall escalation in domestic violence, although that is how this introduction has characterized them. The reader is urged to attend to the reasons for these
differences in interpretation, such as the consistent showing of escalation in official data, but not in victim interviews, in three experiments. Only by interpreting the experiments in relation to each
other, which this symposium invites us all to do, can we fully understand the results.
The article by Ms. Zorza lays an excellent criminal law foundation for the significance of these criminological experiments. It
comprehensively reviews the history of litigation and legislation that
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helped to frame the key questions to which the entire research program responded. It clearly demonstrates the significant stimulus
that criminal law reform movements can have in shaping criminology, which in turn may shape criminal law. And as a representative
statement of the reaction of many domestic violence victim's advocates to the results of the replication studies, Ms. Zorza's commentary on the experiments illustrate the great divide in language,
epistemology, treatment of scientific evidence, values and assumptions separating criminologists and activists on this issue.
While the flaws of the Minneapolis experiment were substantial,
they go unmentioned in the advocates' critique. The flaws of the
replications-at least those of the first three reported, which do not
support a deterrent effect-are highlighted instead, because of what
Zorza describes as the researchers' appearance of seeming "intent
on returning to the old do-nothing or even blame-the-victim practices." 11 8 Such ad hominem comments are unfortunately frequent in
the attacks on the replication results, but they go with the territory.
An assistant attorney general of the United States once told this
writer it was a good thing that the Minneapolis experiment had
found a deterrent effect, for otherwise that official would have been
compelled to attack the experiment's methodology. It is unfortunate
that so many advocates cannot accept the concern of criminologists
with the plight of domestic violence victims, apparently because we
do not always reach politically correct conclusions.
It is even more unfortunate that the battered women's movement in Milwaukee and elsewhere has shown little concern for the
evidence that arrest positively harms black women in at least one
poverty ghetto, where the majority of the suspects are unemployed
and unmarried. Zorza's characterization of those results typically
obscures the issue:
[E]ven if arrest may not deter unemployed abusers in ghetto neighborhoods, arrest still deters the vast majority of abusers . .. [we do not
consider eliminating arrest for other crimes (e.g., robbery), however,
because it may not deter a particular individual or class of
individuals. "19
The Milwaukee finding is not the failed deterrence of arrest, but the
substantial increases arrest produces in the total volume of violence
against victims of the ghetto poor unemployed. We have no evidence that arrest for robbery increases the total number of robbery
offenses robbers commit, nor is arrest without prosecution the typical response to robbery-as it is in the realm of domestic assault. If
118
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we had evidence that the typical criminal justice response to robbery
backfired, we might respond to it with longer prison sentences upon
conviction in order to counteract higher recidivism rates with
greater incapacitation effects. Whether such a response makes
sense when applied to a crime as pervasive as domestic violenceeither for the families involved or for society-is another question
altogether. What seems clear is that prosecutors are generally unwilling to do much with domestic violence cases, especially in cities
with high volumes of such arrests (like Milwaukee). As long as that
is true, we must soberly assess the wisdom of an "arrest-and-nothing-else" policy, since that is all we seem likely to get.
The comment that "most abusers" are deterred by arrest also
misses a key point. While most abusers may be white, married and
employed, the abusers coming to police attention may not be. Most of
the crime, most of the police, and most police responses to reports
of domestic violence in this country are found in cities of over
100,000.120 Most of those cities, in turn, have substantial minority
populations, in which victims disproportionately call on the police
for assistance.12 1 Disregarding these facts in order to pursue a policy beneficial to women who do not live in poverty stricken ghettoes-primarily white women-displays an unfortunate racial and
economic insensitivity to the overall effects of mandatory arrest.
Even if most abusers coming to police attention are not ghetto
dwellers, we cannot write off as unimportant the victims of those
who are.
Professors Hirschel and Hutchison have provided an exemplar
of a comprehensive report on a randomized experiment in criminal
law. Their careful, cautious and thorough analysis provides ample
detail to answer a wide range of questions about how the experiment was done and why it might have found what it found. One
may take issue with their conclusions, but not with the admirable
way in which they present their data.
Their conclusion that Charlotte showed no difference in the effects of the arrest, citation, and separate-or-advise treatments seems
difficult to support. 12 2 The fact is that offenders who were arrested
and issued citations (tickets to appear in court) showed significantly
higher rates of violence than did other offenders, at least as measured by the official data. The authors attempt to explain the discrepancy between the data obtained in official reports and that
120 Computations from FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1991).
121 BLACK, supra note 52, at 134.

122 SeeJ. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison III, Female Spouse Abuse and the Police Response: The Charlotte, North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 73 (1992).
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obtained in victim interviews by citing the under-reporting of repeat
violence in the former, and the much higher rate of reported violence in the latter. We must recall, however, a more serious and
profound difference between the official and victim data: the onehundred percent coverage of the official data compared to the fifty
percent coverage of the sample with the victim interview data. The
two measures, in effect, compare a fruit basket (the full sample) to a
group of oranges (the victim interviews). The differences between
them may be just as plausibly related to the samples as to the
method of measurement. The official data showing that arrest increased violence cannot be discounted, since it was the only measure for the entire fruit basket that constituted the randomized
experiment. The causal inference value of the random assignment
for such a small and possibly biased victim interview sample of what
was randomized is highly questionable at best, just as it was in
Minneapolis.
One point in the presentation of the Charlotte findings should
also be clarified. 12 3 The analyses taking into account race, prior record and other variables might be read as showing that there is no
interaction effect between those variables and arrest. That is not
what the article says. The authors actually state that there was no
two-way correlation between repeat domestic violence and the respective predictor variables of race, age, marital status and employment status. That does not mean that there is no three-way
association between employment, arrest and repeat violence, which
is what is reported in the Milwaukee, Omaha and Colorado Springs
studies. A three-way interaction may be present even when there is
no two-way correlation, just as it was when no two-way correlation
was found in Milwaukee. 1 24 Thus, the Charlotte experiment does
not falsify the prediction of such an interaction, at least as reported
in this symposium. The three-way analysis still remains to be
reported.
As the first to begin and report a Minneapolis replication experiment, Dr. Dunford has already detailed many of his results elsewhere.' 2 5 In this symposium, however, he contributes new and vital
information. In the original report of the Omaha replication experiment, for example, he reported only the first six months' followup
data, none of which showed any differences in repeat violence rates
between arrest and non-arrest treatments. In this analysis, however,
123 Id.
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Dr. Dunford includes data covering a full year's followup (and
more), and while he concludes that these extended data do not alter
the finding of no deterrent effect for arrest,' 26 they clearly support
an alternative interpretation: that arrest causes more repeat violence
than non-arrest.
Dr. Dunford's Table 1 indicates that the frequency rate of repeat violence (measured by new arrests) in a one year followup was
248 incidents per 1,000 suspects among those who had been arrested, but only 154 incidents per 1,000 among those who had not
been arrested. This difference is substantial: arrest caused a relative increase of sixty-one percent more repeat incidents than no
arrest. The odds that this finding is not due to chance are ninetythree percent. This just barely misses the conventional standard of
ninety-five percent, and clearly satisfies a widely used standard of
ninety percent. A not quite as large difference found in the other
official measure (39% more violence with arrest than non-arrest)
has an eighty-four percent likelihood of not being a chance result.
These substantial differences are thus very good bets to be more
than mere flukes.
Dunford's main conclusion is that longer time periods are
needed to assess the full effects of arrest and other interventions. 12 7
While the victim interview data show no differences at twelve
months, they showed non-significant differences in favor of deterrence at six months. Thus both the interview and the official data
show the same trend in effects from six months to twelve months: a
decreasing benefit and an increased cost associated with arrest.
This prompts us to ask how much more repeat violence would be
associated with arrest in an eighteen month followup. Viewed in the
context of Milwaukee's and Charlotte's results, the Omaha findings
are consistent with the pattern of official measures showing that
arrest increases recidivism.
Equal time requires a comment on the article about the Milwaukee experiment, for which I bear the principal responsibility. An
objective commentator should raise the question of a "shotgun" approach to data analysis in which a lack of significant differences ii
the main experiment leads the analysts to search anywhere for differences within subgroups, just to find some significant differences
to report. An objective commentator would also have to note, however, that a "rifle shot" hypothesis that zeroes in on a few theoreti126 Franklyn W. Dunford, The Measurement of Recidivism in Cases of Spouse Assault, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 120 (1992).
127 Id.
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cally driven variables produces a far more compelling set of
findings, less likely to be spurious or chance correlations. The commentator might concede that that was what happened in the Milwaukee analysis, given the publication of the "rifle shot" hypothesis in
another law review symposium some eight years earlier. 128 A more
skeptical writer than the present one might still harbor lingering
doubts, however, and tend to place greater reliance on the outcome
of attempts to replicate the employment interactions in other experiments. That skeptic might then seize upon Professor Berk's analysis as evidence that the increase in violence among the unemployed
suspects caused by arrest has been exaggerated by the Milwaukee
writers. In doing so, the skeptic would be basing a conclusion on
less than the full story.
In the article by Professor Berk and his colleagues, we are once
again treated to that which he has so often provided: the application
to a criminological problem of a cutting-edge statistical technique.
The lawyers who read this volume should take comfort in the fact
that Bayesian analysis is not only unfamiliar to them, but to most
criminologists as well. The technique consists of analyzing data in
one study-Colorado Springs-based on findings from two prior
experiments in which interactions between arrest and unemployment had been found (Milwaukee and Omaha).1 2 9 The conclusion
that an interaction effect is found in all three experiments is consistent with the social bonds hypothesis discussed above. The conclusion that an increase in domestic violence among the unemployed is
not replicated warrants further comment.' 3 0
Professor Berk's analysis of the effects of arrest in this symposium are limited to the prevalence of recidivism, or the percentage of
suspects with one or more detected acts of repeat domestic violence.
Of greater significance to both victims and police, however, may be
thefrequency of repeat violence, or the total number of attacks. As
the report on the Milwaukee experiment in this symposium demonstrates, prevalence and frequency can lead to somewhat different interpretations. Indeed, the conclusion that arrest increases repeat
violence among unemployed suspects is based primarily on the-results for frequency, not for prevalence. Yet Professor Berk does
not report the frequency results for Colorado Springs, and does not
incorporate the frequency results for Omaha and Milwaukee.
As it happens, we do have the frequency results for both MiSherman, supra note 113.
Sherman & Smith, supra note 115.
Richard A. Berk et al., A Bayesian Anialysis of the Colorado Springs Spouse Abuse
Experiment, 83J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 170 (1992).
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waukee (reported in this issue) and Omaha (reported elsewhere). 13 1
In both experiments, the frequency data show that arrest produces a
pronounced increase in repeat violence among the unemployed.
While Berk correctly reports a small prevalence difference in Omaha
among unemployed suspects (57% among those arrested and 53%
among those not), the frequency difference is in the same direction
but much larger. The Omaha frequency data show that arrest
reduces the rate of future violence among the employed from 280 to
176 incidents per 1,000 suspects per year (a 37.1% reduction).
Among the unemployed, arrest increases the rate of future violence
by 52.2% from 412 to 627 incidents per 1,000 suspects per year.
Given the small number of cases in the Omaha sample (sixty-four
unemployed and 175 employed persons), these differences do not
achieve statistical significance. Yet the differences between these
point estimates of the rate of future violence are larger than in Milwaukee (which had a forty-three percent increase in frequency
caused by arrest among the unemployed), and in the same direction.
It seems hard to justify a conclusion that arrest does not backfire for
unemployed suspects, at least in those two cities. Frequency data
for Colorado Springs may well show similar results.
Even if they do not, however, we must again note the differences between Colorado Springs and the other experiments: most
of the suspects there were married and most of the offenses involved
not physical violence but verbal harassment. Furthermore, Colorado Springs apparently has no poverty-stricken ghettoes with high
proportions of persons with low marriage rates, long-term unemployment, low prevalence of high school education, high prevalence
of prior arrests, and other similar characteristics. Thus, the "good
risks" seem better and the "bad risks" seem not so bad in "hi-tech"
Colorado Springs as in "rust belt" Milwaukee and Omaha. Given
the major differences between the samples in the three cities, it is
arguably impressive that the employment interaction results are as
similar as they are.
I will not be commenting on the other commentaries in this issue. Suffice it to say that the Journal editors have chosen a distinguished group of commentators representing a broad range of
viewpoints, from police to women's advocates to legal scholars.
VII.

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

After more than a decade of evaluating arrest for misdemeanor
domestic violence, we still have much to learn. Thejigsaw puzzle of
131
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diverse results in different cities has not been put together, and too
many pieces are still missing. Many alternate approaches still remain untested or unreplicated, such as the impressive Omaha result
that issuing warrants for absent offenders reduced repeat violence by
fifty percent. 32 Nonetheless, it is time we took stock of what we
have learned, both about the substance of the problem and about
the process of doing policy-relevant criminology.
A.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARRESTS

One response to the replication results is that it is too early to
reach any policy recommendations. 13 3 This view implies that the
burden of proof must be on any argument to undo mandatory arrest
laws, or stop them from being passed. Such a view, however, runs
contrary to the principles laid down by the Federal Judicial Center's
Advisory Committee on Experimentation in the Law, as cited above.
The question as of 1984 was whether an innovation of greater severity should be adopted-preferred or mandatory arrest. The initial
experiment supported the innovation, but with reservations. On
balance, the subsequent experiments have not.
Even if we disregard the evidence of increased domestic violence caused by arrest in some cities and with some kinds of offenders, the weight of the evidence fails to justify an innovation of
greater severity-at least on specific deterrent grounds alone. Yet it
is those grounds, alone, which have morally justified the entire program of research. If the FDA had to make a decision about allowing
mandatory arrest to go on the market based on these experiments, it
seems doubtful that it would. On the other hand, if it were asked to
allow some doctors to use arrest on a selective basis when it was
most likely to be effective, they might well do that.
Arrest is not a drug, of course, and it is constrained by principles of justice. The unfairness of arrest guidelines based on employment status would be unthinkable, regardless of its
effectiveness. What may ultimately be acceptable, under the existing principles of community policing, is different police policies
or practices for different neighborhoods. Police discretion already
varies widely by neighborhood,13 4 and community policing is trying
to make it vary even more explicitly in response to community pref132 Dunford, supra note 126.
133 See, for example, the comments of ProfessorJames Q. Wilson in Daniel Goleman,
Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Violence?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at C8.
134 Douglas A. Smith, The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior, in COMMUNITIES AND
CRIME, 8 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Michael
Tonry eds., 1986).
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erences.' 3 5 A local option approach, informed by research on the
specific deterrent effects of arrest in different communities, might
be the best way to develop a workable policy from the findings.
This possibility can be fully assessed, however, only after further analyses explore the neighborhood basis for the interaction effects observed to date. Whether that analysis can predict the likely
effects of arrest based on census tract characteristics remains to be
seen. It may well be more effective at that task, however, than we
have been in predicting city-level effects so far.
Whatever approach may be taken on structuring discretion to
use arrest, the key question is whether any discretion should remain
in the hands of the police. This question has both a philosophical
and a practical dimension. On philosophical grounds, it is clear that
large segments of the legal and advocacy communities want no discretion invested in the police; they can cite legions of horror stories
in support of their positions. On the practical side, no one has ever
figured out how to eliminate police discretion. As Ms. Zorza quite
correctly points out, we have learned that mandatory arrest laws are
widely circumvented. That is all the more reason, it would seem, to
develop an alternative approach.
The available research cannot say what that approach should
be. All it can say is what the results of the six experiments show.
Therein lies the lesson for the influence of criminology on the criminal law.
B.

EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL LAW

The domestic violence experiments show that criminology can
provide factual information about the criminal law and its consequences. That is about all it can do. It cannot, for example, control
the ways in which participants in the political process describe (or
distort) research results in advancing a point of view. It cannot ensure that its recommendations will be heeded, or that its conclusions
will be believed. It cannot speak to value judgments about "just
deserts," even when they are conveniently raised as a fallback position when evidence of deterrence is weakened. It cannot guarantee
that its findings will resonate with the prevailing ethos of the age, as
the Minneapolis findings did but the replication findings did not.
The Minneapolis findings stirred enormous interest by a wide
range of writers and editorialists, who hailed the results as a breakthrough. 136 The replication results received grudging acceptance in
135 MALCOLM K. SPARROW ET AL., BEYOND
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some of those quarters, and complete silence in most others. They
were even attacked editorially by the Milwaukee newspapers.1 3 7 It is
clear that our zeitgeist in the 1990s still favors "getting tough," and
that greater severity is more politically correct than lesser severity
among a broad coalition of both liberal and conservative groups.
This carries a sobering lesson: provisional policy recommendations
made on initial research results may be widely accepted in support
of that broad coalition, but subsequent findings that run against it
may have far less influence. Undoing the effects of initial results
may be much harder than some criminologists imagined, 3 8 largely
because there is less rational interest in minimizing violence than
one might have assumed. It appears that preferences for punishment have more ideological than pragmatic foundations, and that
criminology can only speak to the pragmatic.
This is a sad commentary for a system of criminal law founded
on the presumption of deterrence. It suggests that as criminology
unravels the deterrence hypothesis in its full complexity, the criminal law is unlikely to respond to that information in ways that will
maximize crime control. Rather, the principle of appropriate vengeance, already so strong in the sentencing guidelines movement,
may become even stronger, making deterrence irrelevant. If this
keeps up, we will have no need for a JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY; a Journal of Just Deserts will do just fine.
But times change, and knowledge takes a long time to accumulate. By the time we have fully assembled the puzzle of diverse effects of domestic violence arrests, perhaps the political culture may
become more open to adopting columnist Ellen Goodman's point of
view:
What is progress after all in the course of sexual politics? Is it marked
by an increase in the number of men in jail? Or by a decrease ih the
number of assaults? I don't want to choose between law enforcement
and "crime prevention," but I 13
would
chart the long run of progress by
9
the change in men's behavior.
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